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FURTHER PUNISHING THE
WRONGFULLY ACCUSED: MANUEL
V. CITY OF JOLIET, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, AND MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION
JAMES R. HOLLEY∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
people the right “to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures,” which “shall not be violated, . . . but upon probable cause.”1
The import of this right is difficult to overstate; the Supreme Court of
the United States has repeatedly said that “[n]o right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, . . . than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.”2 In the context of police interactions
with civilians, seizure is broadly defined: “whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
‘seized’ that person.”3 This broad definition demonstrates society’s
intolerance for any unreasonable restriction of a person’s “freedom to
walk away.”
While these principles may be clear to the Supreme Court, the
Seventh Circuit’s view of Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable seizures is muddy and incomprehensible. The Seventh
Circuit held, in brief, that only due process applies when a person is
held after the initial arrest or seizure, not the Fourth Amendment.4 This
Copyright © James R. Holley.
∗
J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2018.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
3. Id. at 16.
4. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 590 Fed. Appx. 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Llovet v. City
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holding conflicts with Supreme Court precedent that demonstrates that
the Fourth Amendment applies to pretrial detention, and this holding
is the issue at stake in Manuel v. City of Joliet. In Manuel, the petitioner
claims that the Fourth Amendment applies to his pretrial detention, but
the respondents argue that the Due Process Clause applies instead. As
a result, Manuel is scheduled to appear before the Supreme Court.5 The
Court granted the writ of certiorari here to resolve a circuit split
between the Seventh Circuit and every other circuit that has directly
addressed the question.6 In keeping with precedent, the Supreme Court
should resolve this case by reversing the Seventh Circuit, and hold that
the Fourth Amendment applies to all unreasonable seizures, including
those that extend through the pretrial period. To hold otherwise would
deprive Manuel and others in his situation of relief in federal courts
where there supposedly is an “adequate state remedy.”7
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 18, 2011, an African American male named Elijah
Manuel was riding as a passenger in his car while his brother drove.8
Police pulled the car over for not using turn signals.9 A police officer,
Terrence Gruber, claiming to smell burnt cannabis in the car, opened
the passenger-side door and pulled Manuel out of the car.10 Gruber
immediately pushed him to the ground, handcuffed him, and struck him
repeatedly.11 According to Manuel, Gruber yelled at him, saying, “[y]ou
remember me, street punk? Now I got you, you fucking nigger.”12
Manuel claims that the police searched his car and tore it apart in the
process.13 Gruber then patted Manuel down and found a bottle of
of Chicago, 761 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2014)), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016).
5. See Monthly Argument–Supreme Court of the United States October 2016,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/
SUPREMECOURT.GOV,
MonthlyArgumentCalOctober2016.pdf (last visited Sep. 28, 2016) (detailing the Supreme Court’s
Fall 2016 oral argument schedule).
6. See QPReport, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.supremecourt.gov /qp/14-09496qp.
pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2016) (concerning the question presented before the Supreme Court in
Manuel v. City of Joliet).
7. See infra note 52 and accompanying text for an example of this deprivation of federal
relief for constitutional violations that are unlikely to be vindicated in potentially biased state
courts.
8. Manuel, 590 Fed. Appx. at 642.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Manuel v. City of Joliet, No. 14-9496 (U.S. May 2, 2016)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
13. Id. at 3 n.2.
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pills.14 The police tested the pills at the scene for drugs and falsified the
results so they could claim that the pills contained ecstasy, and then
promptly arrested Manuel.15
According to Manuel, the police continued to lie about the pills
throughout Manuel’s detainment and the grand jury proceedings on
March 31, 2011, even though a lab report on April 1, 2011 showed that
the pills were not ecstasy.16 Despite this lab report, Manuel was
arraigned on April 8, 2011, and was incarcerated until the day after the
Assistant State’s Attorney dismissed the charges on May 4, 2011.17 As a
direct result of this incarceration, Manuel missed work and college
courses, which he was still required to pay for despite his being forced
to drop them.18 Manuel claims that, since he was unable to work, he
could not pay his bills and had to default on them, which harmed
Manuel’s credit score.19
Manuel sued the City of Joliet and several of its police officers on
April 10, 2013.20 He brought this suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.21 His main
civil right claim was that the defendants engaged in malicious
prosecution, largely because they deliberately falsified the drug tests.22
The district court dismissed most of Manuel’s claims because they were
brought past the two-year statute of limitations.23 The court then
dismissed the malicious prosecution claim on the grounds that
malicious prosecution is a claim based on the right to due process, for
which he was barred from bringing a claim in federal court because he
could have sought relief in Illinois state courts.24 Manuel appealed the
malicious prosecution claim to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing that the malicious prosecution claim was founded on Fourth
Amendment, not due process, grounds.25 The Seventh Circuit disagreed
with Manuel, and affirmed the district court’s decision.26 Manuel
14. Manuel, 590 Fed. Appx. at 642.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 6.
20. Manuel, 590 Fed. Appx. at 642.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 642–43 (“[T]here is no . . . claim under federal law if . . . state law provides a similar
cause of action.”) (citing Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750–51 (7th Cir. 2001)).
25. Id. at 642.
26. Id. at 642−44.
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petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme
Court granted on January 15, 2016.27
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Here, the core legal issue concerns malicious prosecution claims
made under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly,
the following sections grant a brief overview of both Section 1983
generally and malicious prosecution claims more specifically.
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal cause of action for those whose
constitutional rights have been violated by some party acting under the
authority of a state or local government.28 Liability is available against
any “government that, under color of some official policy, ‘causes’ an
employee to violate another’s constitutional rights.”29 However, local
governments may be sued under Section 1983 for actions arising from
informal governmental “custom.”30 Section 1983 is not a source of
constitutional rights in itself, but “a method for vindicating federal
rights elsewhere conferred.”31 Manuel brought his claim under this
statute, claiming that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated
because the police unreasonably seized him throughout pretrial
detention.32 Because the Fourth Amendment itself does not explicitly
provide a civil cause of action, Manuel must turn to Section 1983 for
relief.
B. “Malicious prosecution” claims and the Fourth Amendment
To prove a malicious prosecution claim at common law, the plaintiff
generally must show that: (1) the defendant filed a criminal complaint

27. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 136 S. Ct. 890, 890 (2016).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.”).
29. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).
30. See id. at 691 (“Although not authorized by written law, such practices of state officials
could well be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of
law.”) (quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970)).
31. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
32. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 11.
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against the plaintiff “with malice and without probable cause”; and (2)
the proceeding terminated, prior to a legal ruling, in the plaintiff’s
favor.33 Prior to 1994, most courts of appeals considered Section 1983
malicious prosecution claims in the context of a constitutional right to
due process, whether substantive or procedural.34 However, the courts
that did recognize this claim disagreed on whether malicious
prosecution alone could violate the Constitution, or whether some
other injury was also necessary.35
In 1994, the Supreme Court held that substantive due process is an
inappropriate vehicle for claims concerning pretrial detention.36
Albright v. Oliver37 concerned a man (Albright) in Illinois who
surrendered himself on an arrest warrant for selling a substance that
looked like, but was not actually, an illegal drug.38 However, the case
was soon dismissed because Albright was not charged with a crime
under Illinois law.39 He petitioned the Supreme Court to rule that the
Fourteenth Amendment afforded a substantive right “to be free from
criminal prosecution except upon probable cause.”40 The Court
disagreed, stating in the plurality decision that Albright’s claims ought
to be judged under the Fourth Amendment.41 The Court explained that
when an Amendment in the Bill of Rights deals more specifically with
a constitutional issue, using those specific guarantees is preferable to
using the more general terms available in the Fourteenth
Amendment.42 The Court noted, “the Fourth Amendment’s relevance
to the deprivations of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal
prosecutions,” so Albright should have brought his claim under the
Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause.43
The Court did not directly address malicious prosecution claims in
the context of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, in a footnote, the Court
lamented the “embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion” concerning a

33. 19 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS, DEFENSES, AND DAMAGES §
93.02[1] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2015).
34. Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 98 (1st Cir. 2013).
35. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 270 n.4 (plurality opinion) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d
343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992)) (noting the “embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion” on the matter).
36. Id. at 275.
37. 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
38. Id. at 268.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 271.
42. Id. at 273.
43. Id. at 274−75.
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malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983, but made no
conclusion in the matter other than holding that substantive due
process is an inappropriate vehicle for these claims.44 Despite this, the
vast majority of circuits began treating malicious prosecution claims
being covered by the Fourth Amendment,45 specifically throughout the
pretrial period.46 In fact, only the Seventh Circuit has directly addressed
this question and decided that malicious prosecution claims are not
covered under the Fourth Amendment, but instead under the Due
Process Clause.47
IV. HOLDING
In Manuel v. City of Joliet, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss Manuel’s claim on the
basis that Illinois provided an adequate remedy for malicious
prosecution claims.48 In making this decision, the court relied on its
precedent in Newsome v. McCabe,49 where the Seventh Circuit
considered Albright and concluded that, while an initial seizure may fall
under the Fourth Amendment, any further proceedings against the
seized person must be analyzed under the right to procedural due
process instead.50 The court in Newsome did not explain why the Fourth
Amendment only extends to arrests; the court merely stated that
“Newsome had a potential [F]ourth [A]mendment claim [concerning
the wrongful arrest and detention],” but the statute of limitations had
run on this claim.51 It is unclear why the court in Newsome takes this
stance, beyond the freestanding assumption that the Fourth
Amendment covers only the actual arrest in a wrongful seizure case.
The court in Manuel agreed with Newsome, saying that “federal
claims of malicious prosecution are founded on the right to due process,
not the Fourth Amendment,” and that there is “nothing but confusion

44. Id. at 270 n.4 (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992)).
45. See Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 99 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing to each of the
Circuits that recognize Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims through the pretrial
period).
46. Id.
47. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 590 Fed. Appx. 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[F]ederal claims
of malicious prosecution are founded on the right to due process, not the Fourth Amendment”).
48. Id. at 642.
49. 256 F.3d 747, 750–51 (7th Cir. 2001); see generally Manuel, 590 Fed. Appx. at 642−44
(citing Newsome repeatedly as the court’s primary controlling authority).
50. See Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750–51 (agreeing with Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion
in Albright that some due process applies to criminal prosecution proceedings).
51. Id. at 750.
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gained” by using the Fourth Amendment to analyze malicious
prosecution claims, which concern proceedings post-arraignment.52 The
court further said that “once detention by reason of arrest turns into
detention by reason of arraignment[,] . . . the Fourth Amendment falls
out of the picture.”53 Thus, because Illinois had adequate remedies for
malicious prosecution claims, the court concluded that Manuel ought
to have pursued a state due process claim instead of a federal one.54
In response to Manuel’s claim that the court should reconsider
Newsome, the Seventh Circuit conceded that Manuel had a “strong
argument” for overturning Newsome, at least in part because ten other
circuits recognized malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth
Amendment.55 Despite this, the court stated that “given the position [it
has] consistently taken in upholding Newsome, Manuel’s argument is
better left for the Supreme Court.”56 Presumably, the court wanted the
Supreme Court to resolve the severe circuit split before acting. The
court concluded by affirming the district court’s decision granting the
defendants’ motion to dismiss.57
V. ARGUMENTS
Here, the key issue is whether the Fourth Amendment covers
malicious prosecution throughout the pretrial phrase, or whether due
process becomes the right at issue post-arraignment.
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
Manuel’s overall argument consists of three main points: (1) the
Fourth Amendment covers malicious prosecution claims over the
pretrial period without probable cause, (2) the Due Process Clause is
irrelevant to the malicious prosecution claim, and (3) this claim permits
relief under § 1983.

52. Manuel, 590 Fed. Appx. at 642−43.
53. Id. at 643−44 (omission in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Llovet v. City of Chicago,
761 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2014)).
54. Id. at 644. In making this determination, the Seventh Circuit relied on Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981), which held, in part, that “an adequate state remedy to redress property
damage inflicted by state officers avoids the conclusion that there has been any constitutional
deprivation of property without due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”
55. Manuel, 590 Fed. Appx. at 643.
56. Id. (internal citations omitted).
57. Id. at 644.
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Manuel argues that the Supreme Court has consistently treated the
Fourth Amendment as covering cases of unconstitutional, pretrial
detention of suspects.58 Specifically, he reads the Court’s holding in
Albright to find malicious prosecution claims under the Due Process
Clause inappropriate due to the Court’s preference for “specific
guarantees” over “more generalized language.”59 He argues instead
that the Fourth Amendment would be the proper basis for such a
claim.60 Manuel further claims that the Court’s prior holdings show that
post-arrest requirements for probable cause are the same as the
requirements for an arrest warrant, and thus, permitting pretrial
detention without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment the
same way an arrest without probable cause would.61 Specifically,
Manuel cites Supreme Court precedent to bolster his claim that the
Fourth Amendment covers the entire pretrial period, not merely the
initial arrest.62 Manuel claims that limiting the reach of the Fourth
Amendment would give police officers a perverse incentive to ignore
the need for arrest warrants and press for legal proceedings, despite a
lack of probable cause.63
Manuel then argues that the Due Process Clause is irrelevant to
hisP claim, because Albright holds that the Fourth Amendment is the
appropriate constitutional peg.64 Although there was no majority
opinion in Albright, Manuel reasons that there is no controlling opinion
because the Marks Rule does not apply.65 Manuel then argues that
Supreme Court precedent supports the use of the Fourth Amendment
in these types of cases, both specifically and more generally.66 Manuel
concludes, because the Court in Albright rejected the application of due
process to malicious prosecution claims, the Due Process Clause cannot
apply here.67

58. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 14.
59. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994).
60. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 15.
61. Id. at 20−21.
62. Id. at 20–22 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) and United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, (1980)).
63. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 24–25.
64. Id. at 26.
65. Id. at 27−28. Normally, the Marks Rule dictates that the narrowest opinion controls.
66. Id. at 29–30 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 127 to show that the Supreme Court has
explicitly used the Fourth Amendment for these types of claims, and Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 275 (1994) to show the avoidance of due process’ “scarce and open-ended guideposts” where
possible).
67. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 30.
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Finally, Manuel argues that Section 1983 permits federal malicious
prosecution claims, even when there is a state remedy, because Section
1983 claims that are grounded in constitutional rights are
“supplementary” to state remedies.68 Manuel also argues that
permitting his claim would fulfill the core purpose of Section 1983,
namely, creating a cause of action for compensation of injuries caused
by a deprivation of a right.69
B. Respondents’ Arguments
City of Joliet, Illinois, et al., (“Respondents”) argue that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to Manuel’s claim, and that the Due
Process Clause, not the Fourth Amendment, governs after a
prosecution begins.70
The respondents’ first argument is that Manuel’s Fourth
Amendment claims, while perhaps valid, are time-barred because he
brought them more than two years after the initial arrest, which
exceeds the statute of limitations.71 This argument responds directly to
Manuel’s assertion that the Fourth Amendment covers the entire
pretrial period, which implies that the statute of limitations does not
eliminate Manuel’s claim.72 The respondents reason that a Fourth
Amendment claim has nothing to do with terminating a proceeding, as
required in malicious prosecution cases.73 They also claim that
permitting such claims would deprive people that are merely
imprisoned wrongfully of a cause of action under the Fourth
Amendment.74 They further claim that malicious prosecution does not
have seizure (which is crucial to Fourth Amendment claims) as an
element,75 and malice (which is an element of malicious prosecution
claims) has no place in Fourth Amendment law.76
68. Id. at 31–32 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)).
69. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 33; see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254–55 (1978)
(explaining that “the basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons
for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights. . . . [Rights exist] to protect persons
from injuries to particular interests”).
70. Brief for Respondents at 1–3, Manuel v. City of Joliet, No. 14-9496 (U.S. Aug. 3, 2016)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
71. Id. at 17.
72. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 20. As noted in the facts above, Manuel
brought his claim less than two years after termination of proceedings against him, but more than
two years after the initial wrongful arrest.
73. Brief for Respondents, supra note 70, at 18.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 19−25.
76. Id. at 25−29.
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The respondents further argue that the Fourth Amendment covers
“discrete wrong[s],” not “‘the effects’ of th[ose] wrong[s],”77 and that
time should accrue starting at the initial arrest based on Supreme Court
jurisprudence.78 Further, accepting Manuel’s claim would defeat the
purpose of a statute of limitations, namely, to reduce costly and
complex lawsuits multiple years down the road.79
The remainder of the respondents’ argument is that the Due
Process Clause, not the Fourth Amendment, covers claims after
prosecution begins.80 The respondents reiterate their claim that the
Fourth Amendment applies only to determining whether there was
probable cause for the initial seizure.81 They further state that these
prosecutions have potential problems with abuse of procedure, not
unreasonable seizures.82 Finally, the respondents argue that state law is
a superior vehicle for malicious prosecution claims because it allows
for state experimentation, permitting individual states to determine
what remedies work best.83 They conclude that “[t]his experimentation
is beneficial and permits states to account for variations in their
criminal practice and procedure.”84
VI. ANALYSIS
It is crucial to note, before analyzing which argument is more likely
to succeed, that there are only eight justices on the Supreme Court as
of this commentary.85 Because of this unusual situation, it is entirely
possible that there would be a four-four split, a decision that is very
unlikely to have any lasting value as nationwide precedent.
However, the law currently stands strongly in Manuel’s favor. There
is little doubt, given Supreme Court precedent, that the term “seizure”
in the Fourth Amendment context includes detention awaiting trial

77. Id. at 29 (quoting Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980)).
78. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 70, at 29–30 (“Indeed, even if a defendant has
‘give[n] present effect to the past illegal act and therefore perpetuate[d] the consequences,’ the
date of the original wrong still defines the claim’s accrual.” (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 557 (1977) (alteration in original)).
79. Brief for Respondents, supra note 70, at 32−33.
80. Id. at 34−35.
81. Id. at 36.
82. Id. at 41.
83. Id. at 53−54.
84. Id. at 54.
85. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States–Text Version,
SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited
Sep. 28, 2016) (detailing the presence of only eight Justices for the Fall 2016 session).
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absent probable cause. The respondents’ reliance on other Supreme
Court cases is flawed because the case on which they primarily rely
explicitly does not cover the pretrial detention period. The
respondents’ other arguments are either unsupported, or are simply
irrelevant because they contradict established Supreme Court
precedent.
The strongest point for Manuel’s case is Albright v. Oliver, which
clearly states that explicit constitutional guarantees are much preferred
to more general ones, such as substantive due process claims.86 The
Court concluded that, since the Fourth Amendment is “relevan[t] to
the deprivations of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal
prosecutions,”87 Albright ought to have brought his claim under the
Fourth Amendment, and that substantive due process “can afford him
no relief.”88
The respondents correctly note that this decision issued from a
plurality; however, the Court stated in Marks v. United States that, when
there is no majority opinion, “the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.”89 In Albright, the justices who
concurred in the judgment but not the reasoning either would have
conceded a due process violation in some situations similar to
Albright’s,90 or would have held that there was no substantive due
process violation in instances of malicious prosecution.91 There is little
common ground between these opinions, other than the fact that no
violation of substantive due process occurred. Thus, the respondents’
contention that Albright has no majority force is irrelevant under the
Marks doctrine, and their reliance on Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion in Albright is a misapplication of Marks.92
86. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion). Note that the Court here
discusses only substantive, not procedural, due process. See id at 275 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[P]etitioner has in any case not invoked “procedural” due process.”). But because procedural
due process is just as general as substantive, the Court would apply the Fourth Amendment in the
same way if this claim were procedural due process.
87. Id. at 274 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 275 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975)).
89. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
90. See 510 U.S. at 286 (reasoning that, in certain circumstances, “there would be force to
the argument that the malicious initiation of a baseless criminal prosecution infringes an interest
protected by the Due Process Clause”) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. See id. at 289 (saying that “petitioner has not shown a substantial deprivation of liberty
from the mere initiation of prosecution”) (Souter, J., concurring).
92. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 70, at 9 (recognizing that the Seventh Circuit
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It is difficult to see how the Court could have been clearer; the
Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, governs rights
violations that result from criminal prosecutions, which plainly includes
the pretrial period between arraignment and trial.93
Even if the holding in Albright is insufficient in itself to
demonstrate that pretrial detention may constitute a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court’s other precedent still shows that
Manuel’s reading is correct. In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Court faced a
situation concerning probable cause in pretrial detentions.94 There, the
Court stated that “[b]oth the standards and procedures for arrest and
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment.”95 The
Court further stated that when determining the validity of pretrial
detention, “[t]he sole issue is whether there is probable cause for
detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings. . . . The
standard is the same as that for arrest.”96 The respondent’s reliance on
Gerstein that “[the Court] do[es] not imply that the accused is entitled
to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute” is
misleading.97 The Court in Gerstein clarified that “a conviction will not
be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained pending trial
without a determination of probable cause,” but also noted that “a
suspect who is presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
that confinement.”98 There is no question that by either party here or
elsewhere that Gerstein is still good law the respondents’ misleading
use of Gerstein demonstrates their acceptance of the law contained
therein. Thus, Supreme Court precedent shows that the Fourth
Amendment standard of probable cause applies not only to the time of
arrest, but also to pretrial detention.
This conclusion becomes more apparent through other Supreme
Court Cases. The Court in United States v. Mendenhall held that “a
person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
. . . if . . . a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free
“[e]mbrac[ed] Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Albright,” who would have found due process
violations in some situations like Albright’s).
93. See id. at 274 (“The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty
and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.”).
94. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 105 (1975).
95. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 120 n.21(citing Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957)).
97. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 70, at 20 (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119)
(“Gerstein thus made clear that the Fourth Amendment does not ‘entitle[] [the accused] to judicial
oversight or review of the decision to prosecute.’”).
98. Gerstein at 119 (emphasis added).
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to leave”;99 one is no more free to leave in pretrial detention than
during an initial arrest. Further, the Court in County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin clearly states that a warrantless arrest requires a “judicial
determination[] of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest” to avoid
Fourth Amendment concerns.100 The language in McLaughlin strongly
implies that a detention without probable cause beyond this 48 hour
window violates “what is permissible under the Fourth
Amendment.”101
The respondents cite some case law in support of their argument,
chief among them Bell v. Wolfish, as an example of language that they
argue supports their defense. The respondents reason that the Court
applied Gerstein only to the initial arrest decision, implying that the
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures applies only to
the initial arrest.102 However, the Court in Bell was extremely careful to
clarify that the issue is “an aspect of pretrial detention that is not
alleged to violate any express guarantee of the Constitution”.103 In other
words, Bell, despite the respondents’ claim to the contrary, does not
support their argument, but instead expressly states that it does not
even addressing the issue of pretrial detention under the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, the respondents’ repeated reliance on Bell is only
detrimental to their claims;104 why rely on a case that does not even
concern the issue here if there is more favorable law available? It is
likely that the respondents could not find anything more favorable, and
thus resorted to Bell in the fashion seen here.
The respondents’ other counter-arguments are similarly nonpersuasive. Their contention that malicious prosecution claims include
elements not covered under the Fourth Amendment is irrelevant; the
main issue is whether pretrial detention absent probable cause is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizures. Their argument that holding for Manuel would deprive others
99. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Although this decision was issued
by a plurality, the concurrence declined to join the opinion on other grounds, which does not
affect the validity of the quoted portion.
100. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
101. See id. (stating that “[o]ur task in this case is to articulate more clearly the boundaries”
of Fourth Amendment rights).
102. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533–34 (1979) (noting that Gerstein partially concerns
“the initial decision to detain an accused and the curtailment of liberty that such a decision
necessarily entails”).
103. Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
104. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 70, at 31, 37, 39, and 43 (citing Bell on each of
these pages).
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of Fourth Amendment protection is weak because Manuel’s definition
of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure is
broader than respondents’, and therefore would apply to more
individuals. Further, malicious prosecution claims may add to the
Fourth Amendment burden by requiring a finding of malice without
having to show that malice is an element of Fourth Amendment claims
generally; not all rights are rooted solely in the United States
Constitution.105 The respondents’ final substantive claim that due
process is the appropriate area of law for a claim like Manuel’s is
likewise non-persuasive, because, as shown above, the Fourth
Amendment clearly applies to Manuel’s claim. Even if Manuel could
make a due process claim, there is no reason to suppose that Manuel
could not make such a claim in addition to a Fourth Amendment claim.
The respondents’ policy arguments, while well-reasoned, cannot
outweigh constitutional mandates as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, and so do not deserve consideration here.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment is a precious safeguard against violations
of the “sacred . . . right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”106 There is little
doubt that the Supreme Court considers this right to extend to all
unreasonable seizures throughout the pretrial period. The Seventh
Circuit’s decision below and the respondents’ stance here as regarding
the Fourth Amendment’s applicability are indefensible, and the
Supreme Court should reaffirm the coverage of the Fourth
Amendment as it pertains to pretrial detention.

105. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 78−79 (1982)
(distinguishing between “congressionally created rights” and “constitutional rights”) (overruled
on other grounds by statute).
106. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891)).

